POLLUTION CONTROL COSTS TOO MUCH!
An Address By
An Address By
Kenneth M.
Karch, PE
Executive Director
Iowa Department of Environmental Quality
Des Moines, Iowa 50216
Des Moines, Iowa 50216
Before the
Institute of Environmental Sciences
Shoreham-Americana Hotel
Washington, D. C.
Shoreham-Americana Hotel
Washington, D. C.
April 30, 1974
I would like
to spend the next 15 or 20 minutes talking about a basic defect in the
mechanism which this nation has chosen to control pollution and to suggest an
alternative which I believe requires serious consideration by the Congress and the
Federal and State Environmental Control Agencies. in suggesting this mechanism,
I speak as an engineer with 10 years of experience in local and state pollution
control agencies, consulting engineers, and with a regional planning agency, and
not in my current capacity as Director of the Iowa Department of Environmental
Quality.
The basic
reason for undertaking economic activity is to produce more of the goods and
services that people want. Unfortunately, as a byproduct of this production of
goods and services, waste products are generated. These waste products are
generally dispersed into the air, into the water, or onto the land, thereby causing
pollution and other social costs. Because these costs are not accounted for in
the price of the products, they are called external costs, because they are
outside the decision making process of the industry or municipality.
Disposal of these
materials into the air, water and land has been done indiscriminately in the
past because these resources were essentially free for the taking; therefore,
dischargers maximize the use of these resources.
As a result
of each industry and municipality wishing to utilize the free resource to the
maximum extent, the resource capacity for assimilation of discharged materials was
exceeded, resulting in air pollution, water pollution and the degradation of
our land.
Such a
preemption of the assimilative capacity raises the cost to other users of these
resources in terms of adverse health effects, property damage, vegetation
damage, destruction of natural environments, etc., and in a sense constitutes a
capture of the public domain for private use without compensation or in the case
of a public discharge, a taking of a right without compensation. Neither of
those concepts has achieved widespread legal support.
It was
generally conceded that the free enterprise economic system should adjust itself
to account for these external costs through some kind of a balancing of
benefits and costs among users. The question was how this could be accomplished.
It seemed
that there were two basic approaches which might be followed. The first
approach was that of direct governmental regulation of individual dischargers.
The second was to develop sufficient governmental regulation to allow the
market place to allocate these scarce natural resources and internalize the
environmental and social costs arising from the disposal of waste materials
into the environment.
The approach
that was selected in the United States to solve air and water pollution
problems was that of direct governmental regulation of individual dischargers.
This approach had been used for many years on the State and local level and
recently, with the passage of Federal water and air pollution legislation, has
been adopted by the Federal government as well.
I should like
to suggest in this paper that this approach has largely failed to accomplish
the job, has resulted in the waste of huge amounts of scarce public funds, has
helped turn the public off on government while building a massive and
essentially unnecessary bureaucracy, has delayed the solution to problems, has
had severe anti-competitive effects, has created a massive and nationally
significant strains on limited energy resources.
Because there
are no continuing positive economic incentives to abate pollution, the strict
governmental regulation effort has generated reluctance by municipalities and
industries to control pollution which has manifested itself in excuses for
inaction, proposals for long-term studies to solve the problem, delays of
various kinds and ultimately court fights--some of which have delayed effective
pollution control for years. In order to try to counteract the negative effects
of the direct governmental regulatory program, we have attempted to give tax
write-offs and subsidies of various kinds to industry, and have developed a construction
grant program for municipalities which provided funds for industry as well,
until recently.
The pure
governmental regulation control method has severe anticompetitive aspects.
Economies of scale in production apply equally well to pollution control.
Pollution control costs for large industries per unit of production generally
tend to be lower than for a small industry. In addition, larger industries tend
to be better capitalized, tend to be able to fight regulation more effectively,
tend to be able to get more time for compliance, and are generally better able
to cope with the regulatory function.
Direct governmental
regulation has had severe tax impact as well. Municipalities suddenly were
faced with large increases in property taxes for construction of wastewater
treatment facilities that they generally didn't benefit from since benefits were
largely accrued downstream. Recognizing this, a whole series of construction
grant and loan programs from HUD, FHA and EPA and its predecessor agencies were
generated. The most significant effect of these grant programs was to give
essentially complete control to the Federal, government and to create a near
perfect pork-barrel program (everybody gets a little; it's a popular issue;
it's a move in the direction of more progressive taxation; it provides
increased business for local business, etc.).
A direct
governmental regulation program had substantial impacts upon intergovernmental
cooperation. The large Federal construction grant programs may have encouraged
a "go it alone" attitude, since without such grants local communities
probably could not have afforded to go it alone. The recent industrial
repayment provision has effectively discouraged industry from seeking out intergovernmental
regional joint municipal-industrial treatment approaches. And finally, the
States' seem to be fighting amongst each other to get the biggest piece of the
Federal construction grants pie in the development of their needs surveys.
The
regulatory approach was a deterrent to innovative solutions to pollution problems.
The regulatory approach encouraged "end-of-the-pipe" technology. The
construction grants and other public subsidy programs has discouraged improved in-plant
housekeeping and process changes and reduced innovative waste recovery and
reuse and recycling efforts. The program has largely ignored the benefits which
might be achieved through progressive urban and basin planning. The regulatory
approach has largely ignored the concept of land capability for development
and other land use issues. These issues are only now beginning to be recognized
in the designation of the water quality limited segments of our streams.
The
regulatory approach upsets the market system by causing sometimes serious
distortions in market decisions. There is essentially no way in telling whether
an extra dollar in pollution control costs produces an extra dollar in
benefits. Industry has been forced to aim at a continually moving pollution control
target.
Finally, the
emphasis upon governmental regulation has caused technical and economic
feasibility problems. The time limitations spelled out in the Clean Air Act and
the Water Quality Act were determined with more hope than realism and grave
doubts are being expressed about their attainability by EPA and Congress as
well as industry. In addition, governmental regulation has played a major part
in placing a strain on certain resources including gasoline, natural gas, and
low sulfur fuel.
When I was named
to organize and head Iowa's then new Department of Environmental Quality some
two years ago, I enjoyed toying with my audiences by saying that one of my
primary tasks was to assure that we spent as little as possible on pollution
control in the State. This attitude both horrified the environmentalists, and
pleased the polluters, until each began to understand what I meant.
I was
convinced then, and I remain convinced today, that the methods being used
throughout the nation to control pollution are grossly inefficient from an economic
standpoint and although I have no way of proving it, I am convinced that the
public is paying, either through increased taxes or increased prices, half
again as much and perhaps twice as much as it should have to pay to meet the ambient
or water quality standards set up as a result of the air and water pollution
control acts. I believe Congress as well as Federal and State pollution control
agencies have gone a long way down the road to creating a public crisis of confidence
by insisting on a system of uniform national effluent or emission standards, an
incredible emphasis on end-of-the-pipe technology and the creation of a near
perfect pork-barrel program of municipal construction grants.
Let me say at
this point, that I recognize the social, political, technical, and legal
problems associated with the control of air and water pollution in metropolitan
areas and in no ways are my remarks today to be construed to downplay those
problems. Nevertheless, I feel that a major restructuring of the approach that
this nation has used in its air and water pollution control efforts is
necessary at the earliest possible time. The reasons for this are many and
varied.
First of all,
the planning, construction, and operation and maintenance of air and water pollution
control facilities have become a significant part of this nation's gross
national product. Expenditures for air and water pollution control have been
rising continuously for 20 years or more and promise to continue to rise in the
short-term future. In view of the increasing demands upon limited State and
Federal resources as well as private investment capital, it is essential that
funds used for pollution control be expended in the most efficient manner
possible.
Second,
public expectations created by the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments and
the Water Quality Act Amendments will not permit excuses when deadlines arrive
that are not met. Only through economically efficient expenditure of these
limited resources, can we hope to ever come close to achieving these deadlines.
And third,
and finally, environmentalists are in a very vulnerable position if expenditures
for air and water pollution control are not made effectively due to the pressures
being applied resulting from the energy crisis.
During the
last 2 years I have learned a little bit about tilting with windmills.
Nevertheless,
I am heartened by a considerable amount of recent literature describing
alternatives to the governmental regulations scheme for controlling air and
water pollution. Most of these proposed alternatives involve the use of
economic incentive techniques of one sort or another, primarily taxes, effluent
charges, and environment leasing mechanisms. It is not my intent in this paper
to defend any one particular method, nor to debate their pros and cons. I have
attached a bibliography for those who wish to pursue this matter further.
Basically the
objective of the various economic incentive plans for controlling air and water
pollution rest upon bringing to bear market forces in allocating resources.
As you know, one
of the most basic aspects of pollution is that the generator of the pollutant is
generally not harmed by it. That harm is often borne by other persons (for
example, a downstream community subject to discharges of sewage from an
upstream community, or farmers who live downwind from the copper smelter.)
Furthermore, the
impacts of the pollutant are generally spread among a large number of
receivers. Thus the economic incentive to use the courts was nonexistent, since
virtually any court of equity would rule that the massive interest of the
polluter was of more importance than the individual interest of the recipient
of the pollution. While the class action suit concept helped reverse this legal
problem, only in rare cases was the social cost being imposed upon society
internalized to the polluter by requiring that these social costs be reflected
in the cost of the products of that producer.
While the
attempt to establish uniform effluent or emission standards for all industries
of like nature will tend to internalize some of these external costs by
reducing discharges, such a system inherently results in over-kill for some
industries and inadequate control in others, thereby wasting resources, at the
same time doing a less than adequate job.
In addition,
because of economies of scale, large industries who are forced to meet a
uniform effluent standard will do so often at a cost per unit of output substantially
less than their smaller competitors, thereby offering large industries a
competitive advantage over small industries, contrary to the expressed intent
of other Federal legislation. Reliance upon a tax or effluent charge or assimilative
capacity exceed capacity of the stream or air shed while assuring that those
industries with the least cost treatment options would treat (generally the
large industries) while those with high unit cost of treatment (the small
industries) would continue to discharge.
The simplest
market scheme to implement might involve the rental or lease of the
environmental resource, the air, the stream, the lake, etc. to the highest
bidder. This was proposed for ocean dumping in the 1971 Economic Report of the
President. Such a system would limit the amount of discharge directly but would
allow the price for discharging a unit amount of a substance to be set
indirectly by the market system. Under such a plan, a governmental agency would
determine the capacity of a resource to assimilate different wastes and would
then issue permits specifying the type and amount of waste with the total amount
permitted not to exceed the natural limit of the resource.
Then the
government would auction off these permits to the highest bidders and allow
private resale thereby allowing a price to be established for the use of the
resource.
Since the
prices that the bidders would be willing to pay would measure the costs of
alternative waste disposal methods, this method would ensure that scarce waste
assimilative capacity of the resource was being put to its most productive use.
The beauty of the system lies in its simplicity and flexibility, reducing
governmental involvement to the setting of the environment's assimilative
capacity (just as we are doing now), the monitoring of discharges and the
collection of fees. The revenue derived from the sale of the permits could be applied
to other environmental needs.
Other
techniques using effluent changes and taxes have also been suggested, in order to
cope with particular problems such as interstate control, etc. No single set of
economic control techniques will suffice and some combination of such
techniques and direct governmental regulation will probably be necessary I
believe it is long past the time when we can be satisfied with engineering
solutions without considering other factors, and l would urge the Congress and
the EPA to press forward with studies of the advantages and disadvantages of
alternative regulatory mechanisms so that we can have a basis for making rational,
cost-effective decisions on the future of pollution control in this country
while minimizing aversive controls which limit freedom of choice.
Bibliography
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J., Environmental Quality and New York. City, First National
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--- , More Effective
Programs for a Cleaner Environment, A Statement on National Policy by the Research and
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Page, Talbot, Testimony before EPA
Upon the Interpretation of No Significant Determination" For the Clean Air
Act, Aug. 29, 1973.
Solon, Robert M., The Economists
Approach to Pollution and Its Control", Science 173:498, August 6, 1971.
Westman, Walter E. & Gifford,
Roger M., "Environmental Impact Controlling the Overall Level", Science
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Delogu, Orlando E., "A State
Approach to Effluent Change," Maine Law Review 23:2:281, 1971.
Freeman, A.
Myrick, "Economic Incentives in Water Pollution Control,"
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Seaquaves, J. A.
"Surcharges and Stream Changes as Economic Incentives," North Carolina
State University West Raleigh Station, Raleigh, N. C., 1972.
Freeman, A.
Myrick, & Haveman, Robert H., “Residuals Changes for Pollution
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177:322, July 28, 1972.
Hardin, Garret,
The Tragedy of the Commons, Science 162,1243, 1968.
Wallich, H. C., Fortune,
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